



Revisiting Article 41.2 
Throughout the history of Bunreacht na hÉireann, Article 41.2 has been one of the most consistently 
controversial provisions. From the moment the Constitution was published, this provision provoked 
anger from women’s groups and for a long time now it has been generally recognised that this 
provision is in need of reform. Following years of vague promises to take action, the government 
recently announced its intention to hold a referendum on Article 41.2 in the coming year. However, 
at present, it is unclear whether the referendum proposal would be one which would repeal the 
provision or amend it. In this context and in advance of a potential referendum campaign, the aim of 
this piece is to attempt to clarify the purpose and potential of this provision with a view to 
recommending the most appropriate approach for a vote on this topic. First, it will be necessary to 
go back and investigate the origins and original intent behind this seemingly unusual provision. Then 
the practical effect of the provision, in terms of its impact on case law, will be analysed. Finally, 
potential reform proposals will be considered. 
 
The Origins of Article 41.2 
Drafts of the Constitution 
Many writers have mused about the potential original intent of Article 41.2 and the reasons for its 
inclusion in the Constitution in the first place. The provision had no equivalent in the earlier 
Constitution and was one of the new additions inserted in 1936. The first trace of this provision 
appears in the very simple form of ‘protection of maternity’ in John Hearne’s Draft Heads of a 
Constitution, drawn up in October 1936. Article 62 of this early draft reads as follows: 
The Family 
1. Guarantee of the constitution and protection of the family as the basis of moral 
education and social discipline. 
2. Protection of marriage. 
3. Prohibition against attacks on purity, health and sacredness of family life. 
4. Protection of maternity.1 
This document was the first significant step made in the drafting process which culminated in the 
1937 Constitution. Only Hearne and de Valera were involved at this time and it is impossible to say 
whether it was Hearne or de Valera who originally proposed the inclusion but, according to Dr 
Eugene Broderick, who has recently published a biography of John Hearne, ‘at this (very) early stage 
in the drafting process it is possible that draft Article 62 reflected Hearne’s input’.2 Nevertheless, it 
was an issue that de Valera felt very strongly about. Some historians have argued that de Valera’s 
views on women and motherhood were influenced by his own personal circumstances, whereby he 
                                                          
1 UCD Archives: P150/2373. 
2 Eugene Broderick unpublished notes. 
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was left to be raised by his grandmother in Ireland while his mother went to work in New York.3 Of 
course this is entirely probable. Broderick has written that: ‘When Hearne presented de Valera with 
the draft heads containing Article 62, its sentiments were approved of by him. Hearne was 
articulating in a preliminary document what de Valera was feeling at the deepest personal level: the 
importance of family and the centrality of the mother’s role in the family unit.’4 
There were many more influences at play besides de Valera’s personal circumstances, however. As a 
comparative constitutional scholar, Hearne was familiar with the European constitutions of the day 
and it is clear that many provisions in the Constitution were influenced by the 1919 German Weimar 
Constitution,5 among others.6 Article 41.2 is no different in that regard. Article 103 of the 1921 Polish 
Constitution stated that ‘Maternity is protected by special laws.’ Article 126 of the Czechoslovak 
Constitution of 1920 provided that ‘Marriage, the family and motherhood shall be under the special 
protection of the law.’ Article 119 of the Weimar Constitution declared that: 
Marriage, as the foundation of family life and of the preservation and growth of the 
nation, is under the special protection of the Constitution. … The preservation of the 
purity and health of the family and its social advancement is the task both of the State 
and of local authorities. … Motherhood has a claim upon the protection and care of the 
State. 
Donal Coffey7 has also noted similar provisions in the 1920 Constitution of the Esthonian Republic,8 
the 1921 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,9 the 1931 Constitution of 
the Spanish Republic,10 and the 1933 Constitution of Portugal.11 Thus, while it is sometimes felt that 
Article 41.2 was the result of a particularly Catholic Irish influence, it is important to remember that 
such sentiments were very popular in Europe at the time, even in non-Catholic jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, Catholic thinking was also a major influence on this provision. At the time, Ireland was 
a deeply conservative society; its values were Catholic and patriarchal, with women consigned to the 
role of mothers within the family home. Hearne was a devoted Catholic, having trained for six years 
in clerical formation. In this preparatory document he gave expression to the dominant social values 
                                                          
3 This is certainly the view of one of his biographers, Tim Pat Coogan, who writes of ‘the experiences which 
befell him in childhood after his mother went out to work’. See Coogan, De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow 
(Hutchinson 1993) 497. See also JJ Lee, Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society (CUP 1989) 207; and Owen 
Dudley Edwards, Éamon de Valera (University of Wales 1987) 31, 32. 
4 Eugene Broderick, unpublished notes. 
5 See, for example, Gerard Hogan, ‘Binchy Memorial Lecture – Some thoughts on the origins of the 
Constitution’ (Burren Law School 2012).  
6 A book was produced containing many constitutions from around the world which had been used by the 
1922 Constitution Committee. See B Shiva Rao (ed), Select Constitutions of the World (Madras Law Journal 
Press 1934). De Valera’s official biography states that he found this to be useful in his drafting work. See TP 
O’Neill and Pádraig Ó Fiannachta, De Valera, vol ii (Clo Morainn 1970). 
7 See Donal Coffey, Drafting the Irish Constitution 1935–1937: Transnational Influences in Inter-War Europe 
(forthcoming, Palgrave Macmillan 2018). 
8 Article 25 provided for ‘the protection of maternity’. 
9 Article 27(2) stated: ‘It shall be the concern of the State … to give special protection to mothers.’ 
10 Article 43: ‘The State shall … give protection to maternity.’ 




of contemporary society, values he essentially endorsed.12 Also, while Fr McQuaid’s involvement in 
the drafting of the Constitution has sometimes been overstated, his influence would have been 
significant. He became involved personally around November 193613 and, since he was a family 
friend, de Valera could rely on him to provide a Catholic perspective on social matters, in 
particular.14 Broderick has written that ‘McQuaid’s most significant contribution was a sharp focus 
on Catholic social teachings as they applied to the family and, by extension, to women, who were 
defined in terms of motherhood. The clearest evidence is in the introduction of language drawn 
from Catholic documents.’15 Coffey has also noted that McQuaid’s involvement was not confined to 
the provision on the family but he was involved in drafting many more Articles, such as Article 6 and 
many of the other fundamental rights provisions.16 Keogh and McCarthy have also written about 
McQuaid’s influence on the text and, by analysing various letters and documents from McQuaid’s 
archives, they surmise that many Articles were sent to McQuaid to obtain his views. He would make 
certain changes and these would be returned to de Valera and Hearne and a version would be 
agreed upon.17 It is difficult to know when exactly McQuaid became involved with Article 41.2 
specifically but his influence is certainly noteworthy.  
It is possible to track the evolution of the provision to a certain extent in the drafts18 and this gives us 
some understanding of the meaning and context. The provision was developed during the drafting 
stages beyond the simple sentence contained in Hearne’s original suggestions and there were a 
number of different versions before the final text was agreed. Coffey has noted that provision was 
fleshed out in the draft of mid October, which stated: ‘Maternity is under the special protection of 
the State. Provision may be made by law for the supervision and inspection of lying-in hospitals and 
nursing homes.’19 And a further guarantee was added: ‘The State shall encourage early marriage and 
foster the production of large families by appropriate grants of remission of taxation in respect of 
children, by the promotion of saving and thrift schemes and by facilitating the provision of housing 
accommodation on reasonable terms.’20 This is certainly reminiscent of the Weimar provision. 
 In what Broderick refers to as the ‘Zurich Draft’, which he dates around late December/early 
January but may have been produced earlier, there was an elaboration of these issues around the 
family with very specific provisions around protection of marriage and prohibition of contraception. 
1. The State guarantees the constitution and protection of the family as the basis of moral 
education and social discipline and harmony, and the sure foundation of ordered society. 
2. (1) The constitution of the family depends upon valid marriage. 
(2) Marriage, as the basis of family life, is under the special protection of the State;   attacks 
on the sanctity of marriage or of family life are prohibited. 
                                                          
12 Broderick unpublished notes. 
13 He would also have been involved in the earlier Jesuit submission of October 1936. 
14 However, it is important to remember that McQuaid was a priest at the time – and not the Archbishop of 
Dublin. He was not a major ‘player’ in the Church’s power structure. He was a school headmaster. 
15 Broderick unpublished notes. 
16 Coffey (n 7). 
17 See Dermot Keogh and Andrew McCarthy, The Making of the Irish Constitution 1937 (Mercier Press 2007) 
109–10.  
18 Although it is difficult to provide an exact order given the lack of dates on many documents. 
19 UCD Archives: P150/2385. 
20 UCD Archives: P150/2385. 
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(3) Contraception and advocacy of the practice of contraception are prohibited and the 
possession, use, sale, and distribution of contraceptives shall be punishable. 
(4) No law shall be enacted authorising the dissolution of a valid consummated marriage of 
baptized persons. No law shall be enacted authorising the annulment of marriage save on 
the following grounds, namely that either or both of the parties did not agree to enter into 
the marriage contract, or was or were not free to enter, or did not freely enter into the 
marriage contract, or that the marriage was under the law for the time being in force invalid 
in form. Subject to the foregoing, the contract of marriage shall be regulated by law. 
(5) The State shall encourage early marriage and foster the production of large families by 
appropriate grants of remission of taxation in respect of children, by the promotion of saving 
and thrift schemes and by facilitating the provision on housing accommodation on 
reasonable terms. 
 (6) Maternity is under the special protection of the State. Provision may be made by law for 
the supervision and inspection of lying-in hospitals and maternity nursing homes.21 
Another later draft prepared by Hearne, called the ‘third draft’ and dated 11 January 1937, contains 
no mention of women, even as mothers. The focus is on the family and its legal protection by the 
prohibition of divorce.22 But by February 1937, the bones of the eventual Article 41.2 began to 
appear: 
In particular, the State recognises that so much importance attaches to the guidance of 
woman in the family, as a firm support to the State, that the common welfare cannot be 
achieved without her. The State shall therefore see to it that woman, especially 
mothers and young girls, shall not be obliged to engage in avocations unsuited to their 
sex and strength.23 
An even stronger iteration labelled the ‘X Draft’ and written by McQuaid, also in February, is quite 
close to some of the final provisions24: 
1. The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit of society, and 
as a moral and juridical institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, 
antecedent and superior to all positive laws. 
2. The State therefore guarantees to protect the family in its Constitution, Authority and 
Government, as the necessary basis of order as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation. 
3. In particular the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State 
support with which the common good can be achieved. The State shall therefore make it an 
                                                          
21 Keogh and McCarthy date a similar draft (with subsection 6 missing) as October, See Keogh and McCarthy (n 
17) 112 and UCD Archives: P150/2373. 
22 Article 26 
1. The State guarantees the constitution and protection of the family as the basis of moral 
education and social discipline and harmony, and the sure foundation of ordered society. 
2. The constitution of the family depends upon valid marriage. 
3. Marriage, as the basis of family life, is under the special protection of the State; attacks on the 
sanctity of marriage or of family life are prohibited. 
4. No law shall be enacted providing for the dissolution a vinculo matrimonii of a valid 
consummated marriage. 
23 UCD Archives: P150/2392. 
24 UCD Archives: P150/2387, ‘X Formula’. 
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aim to see that women, especially mothers and young girls, shall not be obliged to enter 
avocations unsuited to their sex and strength. 
4. The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of marriage, on which the 
Family is founded, and to protect it against attack. 
5. No law shall be passed which shall impair its essential properties of unity and indissolubility. 
No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the Civil Law of any other State shall be 
capable of contracting a valid marriage in Éire during the lifetime of the other party to the 
marriage so dissolved.25 
 
While any mentions in the earlier drafts referred to the idea of protection of maternity, as per the 
European Constitutions, the focus here shifts in the first extract to recognising the importance of the 
‘guidance’ of women and in the McQuaid draft to a ‘woman’s life within the home’. It is also 
interesting that the final sentence of the third subsection was later put into Article 45, the provision 
which is specifically labelled as non-justiciable, while the rest remained in Article 41.26 
 
Keogh and McCarthy write that this clause was influenced by the encyclical Rerum Novarum, which 
stated that ‘a woman is by nature fitted for homework, and is that which is best adapted at once to 
preserve her modesty and promote the good bring up (sic) of children and the well being of the 
family’.27 McQuaid evidently felt strongly about the provision, as his private papers contain a 
staunch defence of the Article in the face of the criticisms from women’s groups which emerged 
after publication of the draft. In a document entitled ‘Rights of Women’, McQuaid tells de Valera 
that the criticisms were ‘confused’ and he refers to two papal encyclicals: Casti Connubii and 
Quadragesimo Anno, which would answer them. He also notes a statement by Pius XI that ‘mothers 
will above all devote their work to the home and things connected with it’.28 In defence of the 
Article, McQuaid notes that: 
[n]othing will change the law and fact of nature that woman’s natural sphere is the 
home. She is perfectly free to marry or not to marry; to choose this or that career. No 
Article in the Draft Constitution even attempts to deny woman’s fundamental rights as 
a human being. Article 41.2.1 merely acknowledges a fact: the dignity and indispensable 
role of those women who choose to get married. Article 41.2.2 having acknowledged 
that fact, guarantees that it will endeavour to see, not that women will be prevented 
from engaging in this or that career, but a certain class of woman, namely Mothers, will 
not be forced by pressure of need, so to engage in work as to neglect their proper home 
duties.29 
Thus, the provision developed from the original intention to protect maternity (although what 
exactly was intended by this is also unclear) to the February draft’s paternalistic desire to prevent 
women from being forced into unsuitable employment, thereby depriving the family of their 
                                                          
25 UCD Archives: P150/2387. 
26 The part of this provision which later ended up in Article 45 also provoked the ire of feminist organisations 
and a minor change was made to the wording during the Dáil debates in an attempt to assuage fears. See 
Gerard Hogan, The Origins of the Irish Constitution 1928–1941 (RIA 2012) 520–33. 
27 See Keogh and McCarthy (n 17) 113. 
28 UCD Archives P150/2411. 
29 ibid.  
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guidance, to finally the rather insulting insinuation that the proper place of a woman is in the 
home.30 Also, throughout the drafts it is evident that the focus is on motherhood, child-bearing and 
child-rearing, but the decision seems to have been taken at some stage to refer to women generally 
in the final draft and this was also defended by de Valera later during the debates on the 
Constitution.31 It is unclear when exactly the wording of what was to become Article 41.2 was agreed 
but in the first official draft in March 1937 the Article appeared in its current form. This draft in 
general contained ‘an elaboration, precision and complexity of language unlike previous versions in 
earlier drafts’.32 There were many more revisions to the rest of the Constitution following this draft 
but the provision on women in the home remained unchanged. 
 
Dáil Debates 
The wording did not go down well with many women’s groups33 and the criticism referred to by 
McQuaid above extended to Article 40.1 on equality as well as the sentence originally included with 
Article 41.2 but which was moved to Article 45 on the ‘inadequate strength’ of women.34 
When the Article came up for discussion in the Dáil during the debates on the draft Constitution, de 
Valera seemed surprised by the criticism and defended his position unfailingly, stating his belief that 
‘99 per cent of the women of this country will agree with every line of this’.35 In defending the 
provision, de Valera refers repeatedly to ‘mothers’:  
We state here that mothers in their homes give to the State a support which is 
essential. … Is it not a tribute to the work that is done by women in the homes as 
mothers? … This has reference to mothers, and there is no use in bringing into this 
context young girls and people who are not married.36  
Two days after this comment Mr Dillon asked de Valera to clarify whether ‘Woman’ in the Article 
means ‘Mother’ and de Valera replied that the first sentence is elucidated by the second – the 
intention to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to 
the neglect of their duties in the home. Both men agreed that this was an excellent principle.37 
However, on 4 June, in response to a similar query from Dr Rowlette, de Valera again clarified that 
                                                          
30 Rowley encapsulates the insult in the following passage: ‘It was irrational in the extreme, not to speak of 
wishful thinking, to oversimplify women and their place in society in such a way. The rhetorical character of 
the language with its sly imperatives shows no understanding of the complexities involved. Woman is thus 
summoned form [sic] her polymorphous integrity to display only those attributes essential for the male 
survival, wellbeing, and self-esteem, in the name of society and the common good.’ Rosemary Rowley, 
‘Women and the Irish Constitution’ (1989) 37(1) Administration 42. 
31 See below. 
32 Eugene Broderick, John Hearne: Architect of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland (IPA 2017) 133. 
33 Much of the opposition came from university graduates rather than working-class women. The groups which 
actively opposed the provisions included the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal 
Citizenship, the Six Point Group, the Irish Women Workers Union, the National Council of Women of Ireland, 
the Joint Committee of Women’s Societies and Social Workers. 
34 See Hogan (n 26) 520–33. 
35 Dáil Deb 11 May 1937, vol 67, col 66. 
36 ibid col 67. 
37 Dáil Deb 13 May 1937, vol 67, cols 455–56. 
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he was talking about mothers. This time, Mr Dillon pointed out to him that the section uses the word 
‘women’ rather than ‘mothers’ and suggested substituting the words for the sake of clarity. 
However, de Valera refused any change to the text, stating that there are wives who are not 
mothers also and despite accusations from Mr Dillon that this position was ridiculous, he declared 
rather huffily that he had ‘made up his mind that this is accurate’.38  
On the issue of the intent of the provision, de Valera stated repeatedly that he could not understand 
the opposition to the Article, which had as its sole aim the protection of women: ‘I would like to 
know from any women’s organisation or from any woman what is wrong in saying that we should 
strive for a social system which will be such as will not compel women to go out and work …’39 
Members of the Opposition pointed out that the provisions40 were ‘reactionary and retrograde’41 
and that they had ‘destroyed the constitutional bulwark of women’s rights’.42 When the Dáil finally 
heard from a woman on this, she stated that she was glad to hear the intention was not to interfere 
with the rights of women and asked for the President’s assurance that no ambiguity in the text could 
potentially lessen the status of women and then went on to praise the fact that the provision 
recognises the services of women in the home.43 Then she made the following pronouncement: 
‘women will work better in homes if they have been educated and if they have contact with outside 
life. Therefore, I hope that this Article will remain as it stands and that women will avail of it and 
draw from it its full substance and advantage.’44 
The issue of whether the provision was intended to provide some sort of financial assistance also 
came up during the course of the debates but the question was not answered to any great degree of 
satisfaction. At one stage, Professor O’Sullivan asked de Valera directly how he intended to prevent 
women from being compelled to work.45 De Valera did not answer on this occasion but later on, in 
response to an amendment proposing to delete the words ‘by her life within the home’, he declared 
the following: 
What is stated here is, if women choose to marry and found a home, that they should 
not be compelled by modern conditions, which very often force mothers to engage in 
outside labour, to do that, and that it should be the duty of the State to endeavour to 
see that shall not happen. How the State may endeavour to see that is quite another 
question. We leave the methods completely and absolutely open, as it is right that we 
should.46 
He then elaborated with some examples: 
[I]f I were able so to organise it, I certainly would try to get for the community as a 
whole some immediate return from a man who is getting [financial] assistance … But if 
                                                          
38 Dáil Deb 4 June 1937, vol 67, cols 1867–68. 
39 Dáil Deb 11 May 1937, vol 67, col 69. 
40 The discussion focuses around Article 45 and Article 40.1 also. 
41 Mr Lavery, Dáil Deb 11 May 1937, vol 67, col 137. 
42 Professor O’Sullivan, Dáil Deb 12 May 1937, col 221. 
43 Mrs Concannon, Dáil Deb 12 May 1937, cols 242–45.  
44 ibid. She goes on to express a hope that the education of girls will have ‘some relation to the work they will 
have to do for the “common good” in the home, and be a preparation for it’. 
45 Dáil Deb 2 June 1937, vol 67, col 1596. 
46 Dáil Deb 4 June 1937, vol 67, col 1848. 
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it were a woman, I take quite the other attitude. I say a woman, by her duties in the 
home, is, in fact, performing for the community as a whole a fundamental service. I 
would say that she, by doing that work, was rendering invaluable service to the State 
and I would not require of a mother, under these circumstances, any other form of 
return, such as I would be inclined to demand in the case of a man. … The greatest 
service she can render is to perform her duties in the due manner and anything that 
would compel her to neglect these duties would be, in my opinion, a loss to the State as 
a whole.47 
However, O’Sullivan criticised these remarks, saying the Article ‘accomplishes nothing in the 
direction of achieving what the President tells us was the purpose of this Article. It compels the State 
to do nothing. It is exactly like Article 45.’48 Despite some strong arguments from the Opposition, de 
Valera remained adamant that the provision should not be changed and so the Dáil approved the 
provision.  
All of this tells us that the inspiration behind this provision was complex. De Valera’s personal 
experience would certainly have been significant. Hearne’s knowledge of the European Constitutions 
and indeed de Valera’s own reading of these documents49 as well as the obvious similarities in the 
texts of those documents and the various drafts of the provisions on the family are clear evidence of 
the influence of these documents. However, the strongest influence would seem to be that of 
Catholic social teaching due to the personal beliefs of both de Valera and Hearne and also through 
the input of Fr McQuaid. Indeed, the evolution of the provision throughout the drafting process with 
the input of McQuaid and the obvious similarities to the language of the papal encyclicals bears this 
out. 
As to whether the provision was intended to be symbolic in the sense that no economic 
consequence was intended, this appears to have been left open. In one sense certainly it was 
intended to be an expression of the current prevailing attitudes and indeed the ideal scenario based 
on Catholic social teaching. However, the comments about potentially making future provision, 
while vague, signal the possibility of financial support. Indeed, as a counter-argument to O’Sullivan’s 
final remarks above, the provision was not included in the non-justiciable provisions of Article 45, 
which leaves open the possibility of litigation in relation to this issue. 
There is nothing to say that the Article could not have been developed into a rights-based provision, 
as was done to certain other provisions of the Constitution by the radical Supreme Court of the 60s 
and 70s. There are many provisions of the Constitution which were probably never intended to 
function as they now do and it is highly unlikely the drafters would have foreseen the use of Articles 
such as 40.3.1° to create new rights not already contained in the Constitution. However, while more 
radical readings were given to certain parts of the Constitution, Article 41.2 did not feature in this 
trend.  
 
                                                          
47 ibid cols 1848–49.  
48 ibid col 1850. 
49 See (n 6) on Select Constitutions of the World. 
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The Effect of Article 41.2 
We can see that while Article 41.2 may have, at the time of the enactment of the Constitution, 
reflected contemporary mores, it was not uncontroversial.50 There were fears that together with the 
wording of Articles 40.1 and 45.2 it could be used to justify discrimination against women, 
particularly in the employment context.51 Some might argue that these fears were justified given 
legislative measures designed to keep married women out of public service employment. Ferriter 
has argued that the provision52 ‘became essential to the Local Government Act of 1941 which 
enabled the Minister for Local Government to declare, as a qualification for a specified office, that 
the woman holding it be unmarried or widowed.’53 Clear has opined that de Valera intended the 
provision as ‘retrospective justification of the marriage bar against women in public service’.54 But 
then Clear seems to applaud the authorities for not going further and using Article 41.2 to further 
limit the rights of women, as was feared by women’s groups in 1937. 
Scannell, in an excellent article on the role of women under the Constitution, points out that there 
are two potential interpretations of the provision; the first is that it is a tribute to work done in the 
home by women and a guarantee that no mother will be forced to work outside of the home, but 
the second interpretation implies that the natural vocation of woman is in the home, which denies 
women the freedom to choose whether or not to work.55 That the first interpretation is what was 
intended is clear from the Dáil debates and that has been borne out (eventually) by judicial 
interpretation, but at the time when Scannell was writing, she believed that it was the second 
interpretation which was adopted by de Valera’s successors and she points to various legislative 
measures which assume that the normal vocation of women was in marriage, motherhood and the 
home. She states, ‘The women of 1937 were right to fear that the state would give article 41.2 the 
most restrictive interpretation of their rights.’56 While societal changes and the influence of feminist 
movements meant many improvements in the lives of women later on, this particular provision was 
not part of that change.  
In 1987, Brian Walsh, writing about the provision, referred to it as a ‘protective guarantee’ and 
expressed astonishment that it had not at that stage been invoked in litigation.57 He seemed to 
anticipate that cases would be brought and that the courts would interpret the extent of the 
protection provided by the Article. As it turned out, there have only been a handful of cases in which 
                                                          
50 There was no real dispute at the time that the ideal place for a woman was in the home, but there were 
concerns that the provision would become a barrier to work. See Diarmuid Ferriter, Judging Dev (RIA 2007) 
240. There was even a widespread belief that married women in employment should not be competing with 
‘fathers of families’ for jobs. 
51 Various women’s groups objected to Articles 40 and 41, including the International Alliance of Women for 
Suffrage and Equal Citizenship, the Six Point Group, the Irish Women Workers Union, the National Council of 
Women of Ireland, the Joint Committee of Women’s Societies and Social Workers. 
52 In the context of discussion of Article 40.1 also. 
53 Ferriter (n 50) 239. 
54 Caitriona Clear, ‘Women in de Valera’s Ireland 1932–48: A Reappraisal’ in Gabriel Doherty and Dermot 
Keogh (eds), De Valera’s Irelands (Cork University Press 2003) 108. 
55 Yvonne Scannell, ‘The Constitution and the Role of Women’ in Brian Farrell (ed), De Valera’s Constitution 
and Ours (Gill and MacMillan 1988) 125. 
56 ibid 126. 
57 Brian Walsh, ‘The Constitution and Constitutional Rights’ In Frank Litton (ed), The Constitution of Ireland 
1937–1987 (IPA 1988) 98. 
10 
 
the provision has been of any relevance and it has never truly been tested as to its usefulness as a 
protective guarantee for women. 
In de Burca v Attorney General,58 O’Higgins CJ who interpreted women’s exclusion from juries as 
conferring a benefit on women also felt that this exclusion was in line with and ‘almost mandatory 
under s 2 of Article 41’ because otherwise women could be forced to serve on juries and therefore 
take them away from their duties in the home. While it may appear contradictory, O’Higgins CJ also 
commented ‘When one considers the special recognition of women and mothers in Article 41 of our 
Constitution, it does not appear inappropriate that the State in its laws should give some preference 
to woman …’59 In the same case Walsh J made the observation that ‘It is undoubtedly true that the 
Constitution, in dealing with the family, draws attention to and stresses the importance of woman's 
life within the home and makes special provision for the economic protection of mothers who have 
home duties.’60  
In two equality cases, the provision was used to support the conclusion that preferential treatment 
for women was not contrary to Article 40.1 In Dennehy v Minister for Social Welfare,61 Barron J 
upheld the provisions discriminating against men on the ground that the schemes were validated by 
Article 41.2 and, on a similar issue in Lowth v Minister for Social Welfare,62 the Supreme Court held 
against the plaintiff on the basis that Article 40.1 did not require that all citizens be treated 
identically without recognition of differences in relevant circumstances and that Article 41.2 justified 
a difference in treatment. 
In T O’G v Attorney General,63 the argument was made by the Attorney General that Article 41.2 
permitted the State to discriminate against widowers in relation to eligibility to adopt but this was 
rejected by the High Court.64  
However, it was not until 1989 that a case appeared which gave a central focus to Article 41.2. The 
case of L v L65 could truly have been a legal landmark for women. Former Supreme Court Justice Mrs 
Catherine McGuinness, who represented the plaintiff in the case, commented that at the time there 
had been some talk about the potential use of the provision and whether any use could be made of 
it. Thus when she and her junior counsel, now High Court Judge Carmel Stewart, encountered their 
‘brave’ client they decided to ‘have a go’.66 In order to succeed, however, they would need a 
                                                          
58 [1976] IR 38. 
59 ibid 61. 
60 ibid 70. 
61 (HC, 26 July 1984). 
62 [1993] IR 339, [1998] 4 IR 321. In Dennehy, social welfare provisions which discriminated in favour of 
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receptive judge and in Barr J they got not only that but also a judge who truly understood the 
inherent contradiction in the situation.  
The case related to the distribution of marital property related to a judicial separation. The family 
home was in the name of the husband only but, under the rules of resulting trusts at the time, if a 
wife had contributed in money or money’s worth to the purchase price of the house or to a general 
family fund which freed up the finances of the husband, then she could obtain a beneficial interest in 
the family home. However, Mrs L was a housewife who kept the home, looked after the children and 
provided occasional assistance to her husband. She had made no financial contribution to the 
purchase price of the house or to a family fund. However, it was argued that since Article 41.2 
appeared to prioritise the role of the housewife and attributed to it such importance that the State 
was given a duty to protect it, that those who chose this role should not be put at a disadvantage. 
Barr J recognised the ridiculousness of the situation. While the Constitution prized the role of the 
housewife as giving such support to the State ‘without which the common good cannot be 
achieved’, and was clearly designed to protect this role, in law the women who chose or were forced 
to engage in paid labour were at an advantage since they could potentially make a financial 
contribution to the family home and thereby be given a beneficial interest. Thus by becoming a 
housewife, despite the grand language in the Constitution, a woman in this situation was in a weak 
position in law. 
In a well-reasoned judgment, Barr J noted that previous case law had established that a woman’s 
work in the home could not give rise to a beneficial interest in that home unless there had been 
some sort of financial contribution. However, those cases had not considered Article 41.2. He 
pointed out that in this provision, the Constitution envisages that ideally a woman should devote her 
time and attention to her duties in the home and that in practical terms this means a woman who 
adopts that concept ‘has a special place in society which should be buttressed and preserved by the 
State in its laws’.67 He also points out that many women who make this choice are obliged to make a 
sacrifice in doing so and thus in return for that sacrifice ‘which the Constitution recognises as being 
in the interest of the common good, she should receive some reasonable economic security …’68 
Shortly afterwards, Barr J’s judgment was quoted with approval, albeit obiter, by Barrington J in an 
unreported judgment in a similar case where he criticised the existing legal approaches as starting 
from the wrong point in the law and equity and stated that the proper starting point was that taken 
by Barr J.69 Barrington J also pointed out the inconsistency in the existing laws with the values in 
Article 41 which meant that a woman with an independent income was in a better position than the 
woman who fulfils the constitutionally preferred role of wife and mother. 
However, his colleagues in the Supreme Court were shocked by the revolutionary nature of Barr J’s 
High Court judgment. McGuinness has noted that the legal team was very doubtful of success in the 
Supreme Court, especially given that the members of the Court were all middle-aged or older men 
likely to be the sole owners of their property.70 While certain members of the Court were 
sympathetic to the arguments of the plaintiff, Barr J’s judgment was simply a step too far for them. 
                                                          
67 ibid 98. 
68 ibid. 
69 H v H (HC, 20 June 1989). 
70 See (n 66). This was very common up until the late eighties or early nineties. 
12 
 
While Barr J’s judgment concentrated on the principles involved and took a purposive approach, 
anxious to give some meaning to this otherwise useless provision, the Supreme Court concentrated 
on the traditional development of property law and took a strict separation of powers perspective, 
noting that Barr J was going beyond developing an existing law and had ventured into the realm of 
law-making. The result was that Article 41.2 was now effectively meaningless and no further 
litigation was taken directly on the provision. 
In more recent years, there have been some attempts to revive the provision. In Sinnott v Minister 
for Education,71 Denham J attempted to give an up-to-date reading of the provision. In finding for 
the plaintiff, who argued that the State had breached her constitutional rights as the primary carer 
within the family, Denham J commented as follows: 
Whatever historical concepts and byways may be traced the reality is that the 
Constitution sets out constitutional rights, duties and powers. The Constitution is a 
living document. It must be construed as a document of its time. … This special 
recognition is of the twenty-first century and belongs to the whole of society. It is not to 
be construed as representing a norm of a society long changed utterly. Rather it is to be 
construed in the Ireland of the Celtic Tiger… Article 41.2 does not assign women to a 
domestic role. Article 41.2 recognises the significant role played by wives and mothers 
in the home. This recognition and acknowledgement does not exclude women and 
mothers from other roles and activities. It is a recognition of the work performed by 
women in the home. The work is recognised because it has immense benefit for 
society.72 
However, her colleagues on the Supreme Court did not agree. Keane CJ, giving judgment for the 
majority, acknowledged that her arguments evoked ‘respect, admiration and compassion’ but stated 
that these were not grounds in law for an award of damages. However, Geoghegan J made an 
interesting comment in relation to the provision: 
There is no doubt that in an appropriate case the mother might be able to claim 
breaches of constitutional duties towards her under Articles 41.2.1° and 41.2.2° as 
these are constitutional provisions directly dealing with the family, but it does not seem 
to me that any of the behaviour of the State disapproved of by the learned trial judge 
constituted an attack on the family. For the same reason it would not seem to me that 
Article 42.1, 2 and 3 are in any way relevant to this case.73 
Unfortunately, we are not given any clue as to what an ‘appropriate case’ might be. 
Another interesting use of the provision was made in T v T.74 The case related to the distribution of 
the resources of a couple in the context of a separation and divorce and it was recognised that care 
work could be a factor in assessing the appropriate distribution. Denham J held that the Constitution 
clearly requires that value be placed on the work of a spouse caring for dependants, the family and 
the home and she referred to her previous judgment in Sinnott. Murray J went even further and in a 
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passage that is somewhat reminiscent of Barr J’s judgment, he noted that the wife should not be 
discriminated against simply because the husband had been the breadwinner and, moreover, that 
by working in the home she ‘facilitated and enabled her husband to give the kind of commitment 
necessary to establish a successful practice’.75 He stated that the courts should ‘attribute the same 
value to the contribution of a spouse who works primarily in the home as it does to that of a spouse 
who works primarily outside the home as the principal earner’ and says that this is underscored by 
Article 41.2. But then he gives what he terms a ‘contemporary’ reading of the provision: ‘No doubt 
the exclusive reference to women in that provision reflects social thinking and conditions at the time 
… it seems to me that it implicitly recognises similarly the value of a man’s contribution in the home 
as a parent.’76 
While the result, which gave a value to care work in the home, is to be welcomed and Murray J’s 
attempt to bring the provision up to date is commendable, it is submitted that while it is only right 
that the Constitution should be interpreted in the light of modern society, such an interpretation 
ignores the obvious gendered aspects to Art 41.2 as well as the history of the provision.  
Thus, the only cases in which Article 41.2 has had any effect have been either in defeating equality 
claims or in cases of marital separation, areas which the provision could never originally have been 
expected to impact. It is unfortunate that a case never arose on the direct issue of women being 
forced into employment out of economic necessity but it is likely that L v L would have dissuaded 
any potential litigant. It is tempting to hypothesise about the likely conclusion had such a case, or 
even the L v L case itself, arisen before the radical Supreme Court of the 1970s. Similarly, a feminist 
judgment of L v L or a similar case would have been fascinating. In another article in this collection, 
Mr Justice Hogan argues that the Supreme Court has not been radical enough in its interpretation of 
the text of the Constitution.77 This could certainly feature among the provisions which have not 
reached their potential. 
Despite the admirable attempts by Denham and Murray JJ to breathe some life into this provision, it 
seems clear that as it stands this provision has no real use in law and so the general consensus 
seems to be that we should amend it. However, the form such an amendment should take has yet to 
be decided. 
Possibilities 
Over the last number of years, the provision has been examined by various groups considering 
reform of the Constitution. It is worth noting that it was not considered by the (all-male) group 
which carried out the first major review of the Constitution in 1967. In the report of the Second 
Commission of the Status of Women in 1993, it was recommended that the provision be deleted. In 
1996, the Constitution Review Group did not favour deleting the provision and, noting the 
importance of the caring function of the family, suggested that the provision should be retained but 
in gender-neutral form. The suggested wording was as follows: ‘The State recognises that home and 
family life gives to society a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. The State 
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shall endeavour to support persons caring for others within the home.’78 A year later, the first 
Progress Report of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution came to the same 
conclusion as the Constitution Review Group, but a slightly different wording was recommended to 
provide that the State recognises family life only rather than ‘home and family life’.79 
In the 10th Progress Report on the Family in 2006, the Committee appeared to give careful 
consideration to the many submissions made by various groups arguing for abolition or retention of 
the provision. In the end, relying presumably on Murray J’s judgment mentioned above, the report 
states: ‘The courts are disposed to interpret Article 41.2.1° as applying to either fathers or mothers 
caring in the home. The need to change the Article to make it gender neutral is therefore not a legal 
necessity.’ But then, referencing criticism from the 2005 recommendation of the UN Monitoring 
Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
CEDAW in particular, the Report concludes that ‘Change, therefore, in the Articles is at least 
desirable.’80 The following changes are later recommended:  
Amend Article 41.2.1° to read: The State recognises that by reason of family life within 
the home, a parent gives to the State a support without which the common good 
cannot be achieved.  
Amend Article 41.2.2° to read: The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that both 
parents shall not be obliged by economic necessity to work outside the home to the 
neglect of their parental duties.81 
Investigation into the establishment of some ‘practical support’ for the family was also 
recommended.82 
 In 2013, the Convention on the Constitution also considered Article 41.2 and, in general, delegates 
were in favour of retaining but amending the provision to make it gender-neutral, to acknowledge 
the important role of other carers in the home and to ensure a ‘reasonable level’ of state support for 
carers.83 When the Convention’s report was presented to the government, the then Minister for 
Justice Alan Shatter set up a taskforce to consider the recommendations and to report back to the 
government on the action which should be taken. The taskforce was duly established and it 
produced a report which considered various amendment possibilities and arguments for and against 
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the various proposals. The main aim of the taskforce was to examine all of the variants of the 
wording which had previously been proposed in order to determine which would be the most 
appropriate to bring before the people in a referendum and to consider the cost implications of any 
such proposal. The group engaged with relevant government departments and the Attorney 
General’s office before making its report. Concerns which were raised during this process included 
the need for clarity around the definition of the word ‘carer’ and fears that the creation of a 
constitutionally enforceable right to social welfare payments could curtail the autonomy of 
government in budgetary policy. 
The report focuses on three potential options for amendment of the provision. The first option 
would delete the existing provision and replace it with the following: ‘The State recognises that 
home and family life gives to society a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. 
The State shall endeavour to support persons caring for others within the home as may be 
determined by law.’84 This formula would recognise the importance of care-work in the home and 
would also provide for a legislative basis for economic support, thus preserving executive and 
legislative autonomy over such matters. However, in contrast to the recommendations of the 
Convention, it would exclude carers outside of the home as the taskforce felt that to do otherwise 
would be inconsistent in the general context of Article 41 and would only provide uncertainty. 
Furthermore, it would not commit the State to a ‘reasonable level of support’ and would not ensure 
that carers ‘shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour’. 
The second option was to retain the first sentence above but then to add a provision to Article 45 
that ‘The State shall endeavour to ensure that persons caring for others in the home and in the 
wider community receive support in recognition of the contribution they make to society.’85 Like the 
first option, this has the advantage of being gender-neutral and recognising the value to society of 
home and family life as well as providing guidance to the Oireachtas in Article 45 on support for 
carers. However, while it permits recognition of carers in the wider sense of the word, its inclusion in 
Article 45 is of limited value due to its non-justiciability. This option also leaves out the existing 
provisions on engaging in labour due to economic necessity. 
The third option was simply to delete the provision in its entirety but the Report decides not to 
recommend this course of action since there is much support for the desirability of recognising care-
work in some form in the Constitution. The conclusion of the taskforce is thus to consider 
alternatives 1 and 2 as potential options for a referendum proposal.  
This report is valuable and inevitably will form the basis of a future referendum on this topic but one 
point to be borne in mind is that the original purpose of this provision appears to have been a desire 
to allow children to grow up with a stable presence (at the time, the mother) at home and to ensure 
that mothers would not be forced to work out of economic necessity. The proposals from the 
taskforce have abandoned this element of the provision. 
The language of the existing provision is undoubtedly paternalistic and protectionist but we need to 
decide as a society if that original principle is desirable. Does our society believe that, in an ideal 
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world, a child would have a stable influence to care for him or her at home and that carer should be 
compensated or facilitated in performing such a social function? The original concern in 1937 was 
that women might be forced to work but once the provision which was designed to solve this was 
actually inserted into the Constitution, the fear was that women might be forced out of 
employment. With the passage of time there are now renewed concerns that women may not be 
able to stay in the home if they so choose because it is not viable economically.86 
The bottom line is that we need to decide what we want the provision to do. So much confusion was 
caused by the failure of the original drafters or legislators to specify the clear intent of the provision. 
So, if it is intended towe are to have a referendum on this issue, it is important to lay the 
groundwork first. There are four potential options – three have been suggested by the taskforce and 
a fourth is added here as option 3: 
1. We can have a provision which recognises care-work in the home and provides that the 
State should support this through legislation; 
2. We can have a provision that simply recognises care-work in a symbolic fashion;  
3. We can recognise that care-work in the home is of such importance that the State will 
ensure those who choose this role will be sufficiently supported in economic terms87; or 
4. We can simply delete the provision. 
The first option might seem like a reasonable course of action and the version as set out by the 
taskforce would improve matters by providing a gender-neutral recognition that is backed up by 
state support, which would be provided as determined by the Oireachtas. Visually, there would be a 
significant improvement but the problem with this option is that, in all likelihood, it would mean no 
real change. There is no compulsion on the State to ensure that carers in the home would be 
adequately or sufficiently supported and, as noted by the taskforce, existing legislation already 
provides for various forms of carer benefits and allowances. Thus it could be decided that the 
constitutional obligation has already been fulfilled. Although, it would be entirely possible for a 
radical Supreme Court to decide otherwise. 
One would have to question the value in going through the expense of a referendum campaign 
simply to provide for symbolic recognition of care-work in the State. It might be a nice nod to those 
working in the area but I doubt the warm glow would last long for those challenged by economic 
considerations. While constitutional symbols can be of immense significance, nothing would change 
in law for those people.88 Some care organisations have argued that having such recognition in the 
Constitution has helped carers and dependants to vindicate their rights.89 However, on balance it 
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would be difficult to justify a referendum to retain the provision as a nicely worded symbolic 
gesture. 
The third option was not considered by any of the Reports because it imposes a positive obligation 
on the government and this is something which is seen as radical and should only be done through 
legislation in case there is a need to amend or remove the duty for economic or other reasons in the 
future. However, sometimes the purpose of a Constitution is to shackle government according to the 
wishes of the people – if the people are truly the masters, then the people can decide how rights 
should be enforced. After all, it appears the power of the people to amend the Constitution is 
unlimited. However, it is highly unlikely that such an option would be considered by the government, 
which is ultimately the only authority with the power to bring forward a referendum. 
The fourth option to delete the provision, as mentioned above, was not recommended by the 
taskforce but if all that is sought to be achieved by a referendum is a visual improvement, perhaps 
deleting it from the Constitution would be more appropriate. 
Conclusion 
In looking at the origins of the provision we can see that the inclusion of the provision stemmed 
from a desire to promote the ideal family with support for children in the home. While there is no 
clear evidence of an intention to provide for economic benefit, this was not ruled out either. In fact 
it would have been open to future governments at any time to take action under this provision. But 
they didn’t and while some attempts were made by the courts, ultimately it was felt that the 
judiciary would be overstepping the mark in attempting to read in an economic benefit into the 
provision. However, the element of economic benefit or compensation seems to have taken a back-
seat to the issue of symbolic recognition in the recent reform recommendations, which raises the 
question – what do the people want from this provision? Unfortunately, unlike de Valera, we can’t 
simply to look into our own hearts to find the answer to that! So, what is important is that rather 
than rushing in and holding a referendum on this issue in the absence of any real discussion (like, for 
example, the failed referendum on the age of the president, which simply did not exercise people), 
there needs to be some proper debate on the matter before the proposal is decided upon and 
brought before the people. I hope that this piece has been of some benefit in that regard. 
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Page 7 of the submission also states: In terms of the breakdown of marriage and in custody proceedings, 
Article 41.2 represents a significant instrument for the protection of those who have reduced their 
participation in the workforce in order to care for family.  
